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The Expansion of Federal Legislative Authority 
Terrance Sanda/ow 
I. Introduction 
During the 190 years since the Constitution's adoption, the legislative 
authority of the Congress has greatly expanded. In the beginning, 
Congress's powers were closely circumscribed, but over the years the 
boundaries by which they were initially confined have been almost 
entirely obliterated. Congress has ceased to be merely the legislative 
authority of a federal government; it has for all practical purposes 
acquired the legislative authority of a unitary nation. Especially in the 
economic sphere, it is only a small exaggeration to say that Congress 
· now possesses plenary authority. 
Of course, Congress need not-and, in fact, does not--exercise all 
the power that it may. A great deal of economic policy is left to the 
states. But the reasons are political, not constitutional. If Congress 
determines that a national solution is appropriate for one or another 
economic issue, its power to fashion one is not likely to be limited by 
constitutional divisions of power between it and the state legislatures. 
Although federal legislative power has grown in part through 
amendments to the original Constitution, 1 much of the growth has 
occurred in reliance upon constitutional provisions that have not been 
altered since 1789. By and large, the nation has found sufficient 
flexibility in the original document to accommodate its change from a 
decentralized rural economy to a highly integrated industrial economy 
and from a relatively weak nation with a population of approximately 
5,000,000 to a world power with a population well over 200,000,000. 
Illustratively, the power 'to regulate commerce ... among the several 
states', which is conferred in Article I, Section 8, has proved suf-
ficiently elastic to permit Congress to regulate agricultural 
production,2 the labelling of drugs,3 the wages of employees,4 and a 
host of other matters that the framers of the Constitution must surely 
have thought they had left to the states. 
Since this expansion of federal legislative authority has occurred at 
the initiative of Congress, the pan played by the couns is rather 
different from that which they have played in curbing state action 
inimical to the development and maintenance of a national economy, 
the judicial role that is the focus of this book. In performing this latter 
function, the couns have been the primary agency of integration. With 
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respect to the expansion of federal legislative authority, however, the 
courts' role has necessarily been secondary to that of the Congress. But 
to say that the courts' role has been secondary is not to say that it has 
been unimportant. 
Most obviously, if the courts had taken a more restrictive view of 
Congressional authority, the nation's history might have been quite 
different from what it has been. Given the difficulties of amending the 
Constitution, it is not at all evident that a sufficient political consensus 
could have been achieved to confer upon Congress, by constitutional 
amendment, the full range of powers that it now exercises over the 
national economy. Thus, a proposed constitutional amendment to 
authorize federal legislation prohibiting child labour, though widely 
supported, languished in the state legislatures for two decades without 
ever achieving the number of votes necessary for ratification. Congress 
acquired authority to enact such legislation only when the Supreme 
Court overruled its earlier decision holding such legislation un-
. constitutional and held that it was a valid exercise of the power to 
regulate interstate commerce. 5 
Moreover, whatever might have been the fate of proposed con-
stitutional amendments designed to confer upon Congress power to 
control particular issues affecting the national economy, the question 
remains whether, in the face of restrictive judicial interpretation of 
Congress's authority, a sufficient political consensus would have 
emerged to permit one or more constitutional amendments conferring 
the full range of powers that the Congress now enjoys. Expansion of 
Congressional authority through judicial interpretation of existing 
constitutional provisions permitted a gradual expansion of that 
authority, without the need for a broadly-based political consensus 
defining abstractly and in principle which powers should be exercis-
able at the national level and which should be reserved exclusively to 
the states. 
The part played by the courts in the expansion of Congressional 
authority to regulate economic activity has not consisted only of their 
failure to impose enduring obstacles to the expansion. Students of 
American constitutional history generally agree that judicial decisions 
sustaining novel uses of federal legislative power have contributed to 
widespread public acceptance of the legitimacy of the legislation. As 
Professor Charles Black has argued, questions concerning the legi-
timacy of governmental action-not merely the wisdom or unwisdom 
of the action, but the right of the government to have acted at all-are 
inevitable when governments are limited by a constitution. 6 The 
disintegrative potential of such questions is especially great when they 
involve the distribution of authority in a divided or federal system. The 
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contest in such situations is not the uneven one between government 
and an individual but rather-at least in theory and often in reality-
between competing governments, each of which commands sub-
stantial resources. The danger to the central authority is not merely the 
occasional dramatic conflict over the legitimacy of one or another of 
its enactments, but the corrosive effect of continual challenges to its 
authority that cannot be resolved authoritatively. 
Judicial review has served as one-and in the opinion of some 
observers, the most important-of the mechanisms for mediating such 
conflicts. In doing so, it has conferred legitimacy upon the extension of 
federal power, and thereby increased its acceptance. Just how im-
portant the courts' role has been in this regard is, none the less, open to 
dispute. Questions concerning the extent of federal legislative powers 
were not frequently before the courts in the nation's formative years. 
When they did begin to arise with greater frequency, the dominance 
of the nation over the states had been established by the Civil War. 
Economic realities have further strengthened Congress's position. 
Nevertheless, it seems hardly doubtful that the courts have played at 
least a useful part in gaining acceptance for the expansion of Con-
gressional power. The courts' relative insulation from immediate 
political controversy has given to their decisions the authority of 
disinterested and independent judgment. Perhaps of greater impor-
tance, the custom of justifying decisions in written opinions has 
required the courts to articulate rationales for Congressional action. 
Novel legislation is thus shown not to be an unprincipled response to 
one or another interest group whose political power is temporarily 
ascendant or to the problems of the moment, but an exercise of the 
authority conferred by the organic document that binds the nation. 
Those who oppose a certain enactment may continue to believe it is 
unwise, but they are denied the more potent argument that it repre-
sents a usurpation of power. 
The courts' role in articulating rationales for Congressional action 
has also been important because of the tendency of the Congress to 
shape legislation to the mould of judicial doctrine. The relations 
between Congressional and judicial actions are, in other words, 
reciprocal. Judicial decisions are not merely a response to Con-
gressional action, determining whether or not legislation is valid: they 
also influence the content of subsequent legislation. Time and again, 
the reach of federal statutes and the manner in which Congress has 
sought to deal with a national problem have been determined by an 
effort to ensure that enactments are within the scope of federal power, 
as defined by the courts. 
An examination of the courts' role in the economic integration of 
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the United States thus requires attention to the part they have played in 
the expansion of federal authority over the economy. Although courts 
have not been primarily responsible for that expansion, they have had 
an influence upon it. Judicial decisions have directly affected the pace 
and, at times, the shape of the expansion. They have, moreover, 
importantly influenced the terms of the continuing debate over the 
proper place of the federal government in the regulation of the national 
economy. 
A consideration·of the full range of Congressional powers, even of 
those most directly concerned with the economy, would unduly 
lengthen this study. It would, moreover, require attention to much 
detail of parochial interest only. Accordingly, I shall attempt only to 
describe the underlying theory concerning the source of federal legisla-
tive powers and to give an account of the historical development of the 
two powers, the commerce power and the spending power, that have 
been primarily employed by the Congress to expand its control over 
the national economy. 
II. The Theory of Enumerated Powers (Herein of Implied Powers) 
In legal theory, the legislative powers of the federal government are 
enumerated, i.e. Congress may exercise only those powers that are 
conferred upon it by the Constitution. The theoretical significance of 
this limitation can best be appreciated by contrasting federal legislative 
power with the legislative power of the states. State legislatures, it is 
customarily said, may exercise any power that is not denied them by 
their own constitutions or by the federal constitution. Congress, on the 
other hand, may exercise only the authority conferred upon it by the 
federal constitution. Of course, even when it legislates in the exercise 
of such authority, it must act in a manner consistent with any limita-
tions that are imposed by the federal constitution. Determining the 
validity of an act of Congress thus involves a two-step inquiry. The 
initial question is whether the enactment can be justified as an exercise 
of the authority specified in the Constitution. If that question is 
answered affirmatively there remains the question whether the enact-
ment transgresses one or another of the numerous limitations that the 
Constitution imposes on federal legislative authority. 7 
The understanding that the federal government might exercise only 
enumerated powers was implicit in the original Constitution. It was 
made explicit, just two years after the Constitution became effective, 
by the adoption of the Tenth Amendment, which provides:'The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited to it by the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
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and to the people.' The Tenth Amendment notwithstanding, the 
theory of enumerated powers has ceased to be an effective limitation 
upon the authority of Congress. Although Congress, the courts, and 
commentators continue to give lip-service to the theory, the limits 
that the framers thought it placed upon the expansion of federal 
legislative power are now almost completely eroded. The constitu-
tional specifications of Congressional power no longer serve to mark 
the outer boundaries of its authority, but are the starting-points for an 
analysis that invariably leads to the conclusion that Congress has the 
authority to deal with whatever problems it deems to require a national 
legislative solution. 
Although the growth of federal legislative authority has been 
judicially justified largely through expansive interpretation of the 
constitutional enumerations of Congressional power, it may be useful 
to note at the outset another technique by which the growth might 
have been justified. The object of the Constitution, it might have been 
argued, was to establish a nation and, therefore, a government with 
legislative authority co-extensive with the needs of the nation. On this 
view, the constitutional specifications of power would be taken as 
illustrative only, not as defining the reach of Congressional authority. 
Congress would be authorized to legislate whenever the objects of the 
Constitution, as set forth in the Preamble, would be advanced thereby. 
Nearly all students of American constitutional law would reject 
such an interpretation of the Constitution, but there is, none the less, 
some historical basis for it. The Constitutional Convention initially 
adopted a proposal by Virginia that the national legislature be em-
powered 'to legislate in all cases to which the several States are in-
competent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be 
interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation'. 8 This proposal 
was sent to the Committee on Detail which was responsible for draft-
ing specific constitutional provisions embodying the proposals 
referred to it by the full Convention. The Committee reported back a 
draft constitution containing an enumeration of Congressional 
powers similar to that now contained in Article I, Section 8. 'The 
history and records of the Convention', as several students of con-
stitutional law have recently observed, 'yield little evidence as to 
whether [the enumeration of powers was] accepted because the 
delegates thought that the national government should be strictly 
limited to a specific set of powers or because they assumed this listing 
included the sweeping powers which had been implied by the [Virginia] 
proposal.'9 
Against this background, it would surely have been possible to 
maintain that the enumeration of powers in the Constitution was 
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not exhaustive and that Congress might exercise other powers in 
furtherance of national objectives. To put the point somewhat dif-
ferently, Congress would, on this interpretation, have been permitted 
to exercise powers that were not enumerated whenever the object to be 
accomplished was beyond the competence of a single state. As indi-
cated above, this reading of the Constitution has not generally been 
accepted, perhaps because the Tenth Amendment has seemed to stand 
in the way. Thus, in Kansas v. Colorado, 10 the Court rejected the claim 
that the reclamation of arid lands was among the inherent powers of 
the national government: 
[C]ounsel for the government relies upon 'the doctrine of sovereign and 
inherent power,' .... His argument runs substantially along this line: All 
legislative power must be vested in either the state or the national govern-
ment; no legislative powers belong to a state government other than those 
which affect solely the internal affairs of that state; consequently all powers 
which are national in their scope must be found vested in the Congress of the 
United States. But the proposition that there are legislative powers ... not 
expressed in the grant of powers, is in direct conflict with the doctrine that 
this is a government of enumerated powers. That this is such a government 
clearly appears from the Constitution, independently of the Amendments . 
. . . This natural construction of the original body of the Constitution is made 
absolutely certain by the 10th Amendment. 11 
The unwillingness to infer Congressional power from a generalized 
conception of national responsibility for issues beyond the competence 
of individual states is subject to one important exception. 'Foreign 
affairs are national affairs. ' 12 The full reach of federal power 
over foreign affairs cannot be captured within the powers enumerated 
by the Constitution. Indeed, in the Curtiss- Wright case, Justice 
Sutherland on behalf of the Court opined that '[t]he broad statement 
that the federal government can exercise no powers except those 
specifically enumerated in the Constitution ... is categorically true 
only in respect of our internal affairs' .13 The negative implication, that 
the federal government has powers over foreign affairs that are not 
dependent upon constitutional specification, is amply borne out by the 
cases. In the Chinese Exclusion case, for example, the Court held that 
Congress could legislate to exclude aliens because: 'Jurisdiction over 
its own territory to that extent is an incident of every independent 
nation. It is a part of its independence ... ; [T]he United States, in their 
relation to foreign countries and their subjects or citizens are one 
nation, invested with powers which belong to independent nations, 
the exercise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its 
absolute independence and security throughout its entire territory.'14 
This justification of Congress's power is inconsistent with the theory 
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of enumerated powers, but as suggested by Professor Louis Henkin, 
the nation's leading authority on the Constitution and foreign affairs, 
it alone will suffice to explain the full reach of Congress's power over 
the nation's external relations. 'The attempt to build all the foreign 
affairs power of federal government with the few bricks provided by 
the Constitution has not been accepted as successful. It requires con-
siderable stretching of language, much reading between the lines, and 
bold extrapolation from "the Constitution as a whole", and that still 
does not plausibly add up to all the power which the federal govern-
ment in fact exercises.' 15 Whatever the doctrinal difficulties in justi-
fying plenary federal power over the nation's foreign affairs, there is no 
doubt that it exists. It seems to have been assumed from the very 
beginning of the nation's history that in relation to other nations the 
United States is one country. 
In the domestic sphere, however, debate about the appropriate 
allocation of authority between the federal government and the states 
has been a continual feature of American politics since 1789. From the 
very beginning, almost until the present day, that debate has been cast 
in terms of constitutional interpretation. Different clauses of the Con-
stitution have been prominent at different times in the nation's history, 
but recurrently the question has been discussed in terms of the proper 
meaning to be given one or another of the constitutional enumerations 
of Congressional power. 
In the original Constitution, the most important of Congress's 
legislative powers were enumerated in Article I, Section 8. Among the 
powers conferred by that section were the powers: 
(1) To levy and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts, and Excises, to pay the Debts 
and provide for the Common Defense and general Welfare of the United 
States; 
(2) To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several 
States, and with the Indian Tribes; 
(3) To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the 
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States; 
( 4) To coin money, regulate the Value thereof, and of Foreign Coin, and fix 
the Standard of Weights and Measures; 
(5) To establish Post Offices and Post Roads; 
(6) To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors an exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries; 
(7) To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, 
and Offences against the Law of Nations; 
(8) To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by the 
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Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Depart-
ment or Officer thereof. 
In the several decades immediately following adoption of the Con-
stitution, debate about the distribution of authority between the 
nation and the states centred upon the first and last of these clauses. 
The questions were: for what purposes might Congress levy taxes, and 
what powers not explicitly stated might Congress exercise in making 
'laws which shall be necessary and proper' in executing those powers 
that were expressly set forth? The former question was not decided by 
the Supreme Court until well into the twentieth century. 16 The latter, 
however, was the subject of Chief Justice Marshall's celebrated 
opinion for the Court in the relatively early case of McCulloch v. 
Maryland. 17 
McCulloch arose out of the controversy surrounding the Second 
Bank of the United States. Differences about the meaning to be given 
the 'necessary and proper' clause had, however, begun much earlier. 
Congress had enacted legislation creating a Bank of the United States 
as early as 1791. In doing so, it acted upon the advice of Alexander 
Hamilton, who maintained that a federally chartered bank would 
facilitate the payment of taxes, enhance the government's borrowing 
capacity, and increase capital available for investment. Although the 
Constitution did not explicitly confer upon Congress the power to 
establish a bank or to create corporations-indeed, a proposal to 
confer such power had been specifically rejected by the Constitutional 
Convention-Hamilton found ample authority for the legislation in 
the 'necessary and proper' clause. His reliance upon that clause was 
opposed by Thomas Jefferson, who saw in Hamilton's argument the 
seeds of a limitless extension of federal authority. Jefferson vividly 
stated his concern in opposing a bill that would have granted a federal 
charter to a mining company: 'Congress are authorized to defend the 
nation. Ships are necessary for defence; copper is necessary for ships; 
mines, necessary for copper; a company necessary to work the mines; 
and who can doubt this reasoning who have ever played at "This is the 
House that Jack Built"? Under such a process of filiation of necessities 
the sweeping clause makes plain work.' The clause did not, in 
Jefferson's view, support legislation that would merely facilitate, or 
make more convenient, the exercise of Congressional power over 
subjects enumerated in the Constitution; it authorized only such 
legislation as might be necessary for that purpose. 18 
The charter of the First Bank of the United States lapsed before the 
disagreement was judicially resolved. In 1816, however, Congress 
established the Second Bank of the United States. Although the Second 
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Bank initially had considerable public support, it soon fell into dis-
favour, and a number of state legislatures enacted measures hostile to 
it. Among these was the Maryland statute at issue in McCulloch, 
which levied a tax on certain banking operations conducted without 
authority from the state. McCulloch, the manager of a branch of the 
Bank of the United States located in Maryland, refused to pay the tax, 
and the state thereupon commenced an action against him to recover 
statutory penalties. The state courts gave judgment for the state, and 
McCulloch brought the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Chief Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, seized the opportunity 
to give a very broad reading to the constitutional grant of law-making 
authority. The initial question, as he analysed the case, was whether 
Congress had authority to incorporate a bank. Unlike Hamilton, who 
claimed such authority for Congress under the 'necessary and proper' 
clause, Marshall justified Congress's action in creating the Bank 
largely without reference to the clause. Acknowledging that Congress 
could exercise only enumerated powers and that the power to in-
corporate a bank was not specifically enumerated,~ he none the less 
concluded that the power could fairly be impl,ied from those that were 
enumerated. It was significant, he maintained, that the Constitution, 
unlike the Articles of Confederation, did not prohibit the exercise of 
powers not 'expressly' delegated. Even the Tenth Amendment, 'which 
was framed for the purpose of quieting the excessive jealousies which 
had been excited', had omitted the word 'expressly', presumably to 
avoid the 'embarrassment' that it had created under the Articles of 
Confederation. In consequence, he continued, the question whether a 
particular power had been delegated could be answered only 'on a fair 
construction of the whole instrument'. '[We] must never forget', he 
concluded, 'that it is a constitution we are expounding.' 
... A constitution, to contain an accurate detail of all the subdivisions of 
which its great powers will admit, and of all the means by which they may be 
carried into execution, would partake of the prolixity of a legal code, and 
could scarcely be embraced by the human mind. It would probably never be 
understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great 
outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor 
ingredients which composed those objects be deduced from the nature of the 
objects themselves. 19 
Approaching the Constitution in this spirit, Marshall had no 
difficulty demonstrating that it conferred upon Congress the power to 
incorporate a bank. Although the instrument did not explicitly confer 
the power, it did confer the 'great powers' to lay and collect taxes, 
borrow money, regulate commerce, declare and conduct war, and 
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raise and support armies and navies. '[A] government, intrusted with 
such ample powers ... must also be intrusted with ample means for 
their execution.' The choice of an appropriate means, Marshall 
intimated, was a legislative, not a judicial, decision. 'The government 
which has a right to do an act, and has imposed on it the duty of 
performing that act, must, according to the dictates of reason, be 
allowed to select the means .... ' To be sure, Marshall conceded, the 
power to create corporations 'appertains to sovereignty', but '[i]n 
America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the govern-
ment of the Union, and those of the states. They are each sovereign 
with respect to the objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with 
respect to the objects committed to the other.' Thus, even though the 
power to create corporations 'appertains to sovereignty', there is no 
reason why it should not be exercised by the United States if it serves 
the objects that are entrusted to the federal government. 20 
Only after thus establishing Congress's power did Marshall turn to 
the 'necessary and proper' clause. The Constitution, he wrote, 'has not 
left the right to employ the necessary means, for the execution of the 
power conferred on the government, to general reasoning'. It has 
explicitly conferred authority to enact 'all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers 
.. .'. Marshall rejected Maryland's argument that the use of the word 
'necessary' confined the Congress to enacting laws that were 
indispensable to exercising the other powers conferred. The word does 
not, he argued, have so limited a meaning, as demonstrated by a 
comparison of the clause with Article I, Section 10, which prohibits the 
states from levying taxes upon imports or exports, 'except what may 
be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws .. .'. The 
word 'necessary', like others, 'is used in various senses; and in its 
construction, the subject, the context, the intention of the person using 
them, are all to be taken into view'. 
Let this be done in the case under consideration. The subject is the execu-
tion of those great powers on which the welfare of a nation essentially 
depends. It must have been the intention of those who gave these powers, to 
insure, as far as human prudence could insure, their beneficial execution. This 
could not be done by confining the choice of means to such narrow limits as 
not to leave it in the power of Congress to adopt any which might be 
appropriate, and which were conducive to the end. This provision is made in 
a constitution intenped to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be 
adapted to the various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means 
by which government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would 
have been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the 
properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to provide, 
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by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all must have been 
seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. To have 
declared that the best means shall not be used, but those alone without which 
the power given would be nugatory, would have been to deprive the legisla-
ture of the capacity to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to 
accommodate its legislation to circumstances. If we apply this principle of 
construction to any of the powers of the government, we shall find it so 
pernicious in its operation that we shall be compelled to discard it. 21 
Jefferson's test of 'strict necessity' was thus rejected. Congressional 
authority to exercise powers not explicitly enumerated was to be 
determined by ascertaining whether they were 'appropriate' to attain-
ing the objects that the Constitution had confided to the federal 
government. As Marshall put it, in one of the opinion's most fre-
quently quoted sentences: 'Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the 
scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist 
[sic] with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional. '22 
Marshall's famous dictum that 'it is a constitution we are expound-
ing' was judged by Justice Frankfurter to be 'the single most important 
utterance in the literature of constitutional law-most important 
because most comprehensive and comprehending'.23 The judgment 
applies as well to the entire opinion in which the sentence appears. 
McCulloch is, as James Bradley Thayer once wrote, Marshall's 
'greatest work',24 not only because of the skilfulness and power of its 
argument, but because of the vision that underlies the opinion. 
Marshall understood that with the passing of time the nation could not 
be confined within the specific intentions of the framers. Legislative 
power must have the capacity for growth as the needs of the nation 
might require and political circumstances might permit. The achieve-
ment of McCulloch was to demonstrate that such growth was possible 
within the theory of enumerated powers. Although McCulloch did not 
end the debate between 'strict' and 'loose' constructionists, it laid a 
foundation that would support the expansion of federal powers to the 
extent required by the felt needs of subsequent generations. 
The persuasiveness of Marshall's opinion rests, in part, upon the 
skill with which he converted 'powers' into 'objects'. With two excep-
tions, Article I, Section 8, does not mention objects. It merely confers 
powers. In Marshall's hands, powers became objects, values that the 
people had created the federal government to promote. By converting 
powers into objects Marshall increased the plausibility of his claim 
that Congress might exercise powers not expressed in the Constitu-
tion. 'Powers' are means. If the Constitution specifies some means that 
may be employed by Congress, it is difficult to argue that others may 
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also be employed, save perhaps such as are strictly necessary to effectu-
ate those that are expressed. If the Constitutional enumerations are 
viewed as 'objects', however, it is a good deal more plausible to argue, 
as Marshall did, that Congress may choose any means reasonably 
calculated to achieve them. 
Marshall's argument for a broad reading of Congressional authority 
was buttressed by several 'institutional' considerations. The most 
important of these is only partially explicit in the opinion. Marshall 
placed considerable reliance upon the unforeseeability of the future as 
a justification for broadly interpreting Congress's powers. The Con-
stitution, he wrote, was 'intended to endure for ages to come, and, 
consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs'. 25 
Marshall must have been aware, however, that a need for powers not 
anticipated by the framers could have been satisfied by amending the 
Constitution. The question, in other words, was not whether the 
future was to be bound by narrowly-conceived prescriptions from the 
past, but whether decisions about the wisdom of Congress's exercising 
unanticipated powers should be made by it or through the amending 
process.Marshall never directly addressed that question. 
Those who have followed him have tended to answer it by observing 
that the procedure for amending the Constitution is very cumbersome. 
Were an amendment necessary whenever Congress might require 
authority not specifically intended by the framers, it might be unable to 
act with appropriate expedition. Moreover, amendment requires a 
consensus among the states. A decision by the states is not, however, 
the equivalent of a decision by the Congress. Although the members of 
Congress are elected from the states, and in that sense may be said to 
represent the same constituencies as state legislators, the two are 
subject to quite different institutional pressures. Congress's concern 
with national issues, its interaction with the executive branch, and the 
need of its members to take account of one another's interests tend to 
ameliorate the pressures towards parochialism that exist in the state 
legislatures. 
Neither the broader outlook of the Congress nor the greater ease of 
enacting legislation is, standing alone, a reason for preferring legisla-
tion to constitutional amendment as a means of deciding whether 
federal power should be expanded to accommodate changing condi-
tions. Both can be, and in the course of American history have been, 
urged as reasons for precisely the opposite conclusion. Their per-
suasiveness as reasons for the former conclusion depends upon the 
premiss that the United States is a nation: that the common interests of 
its citizens are more important than their diverging interests. If that 
premiss is accepted, but only if it is, the conclusion is nearly irresistible 
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that Marshall rightly rejected the amending process as the primary 
mechanism for determining whether Congress should be permitted to 
exercise powers not explicitly conferred by the framers. 
The rejection of the amending process left only Congress or the 
courts to decide which powers not explicitly conferred upon Congress 
might be exercised by it. Although not eschewing any role for the 
courts, Marshall again rested upon an argument of institutional 
competence as a reason for vesting the responsibility mainly in the 
Congress. '[W]here the law is not prohibited, and is really calculated to 
effect any of the objects entrusted to the government, to undertake 
here to inquire into the degree of its necessity, would be to pass the line 
which circumscribes the judicial department, and to tread on legisla-
tive ground. This court disclaims all pretension to such a power'. 26 
A final 'institutional' reason for interpreting Congressional 
authority broadly is suggested in a later part of Marshall's opinion 
which is not directly concerned with that issue. After concluding that 
Congress had the authority to create the Bank, Marshall went on to 
hold that Maryland's tax upon the Bank was invalid. A state could not 
levy a tax upon an instrumentality of the United States. Maryland had 
argued that acceptance of the arguments Marshall advanced in sup-
port of that principle would also prohibit the federal government from 
taxing banks chartered by the states. Marshall responded that 'the two 
cases are not on the same reason. . . . [W]hen a state taxes the 
operations of the government of the United States, it acts upon ... the 
measures of a government created by others as well as themselves, for 
the benefit of others in common with themselves'. On the other hand, 
'The people of all the states, and the states themselves, are represented 
in Congress, and, by their representatives, exercise this power. When 
they tax the chartered institutions of the States, they tax their 
constituents .... '27 Especially in recent years, Marshall's argument has 
come to be widely regarded as a justification for judicial deference to 
federal legislation that is alleged to encroach upon the reserved powers 
of the states. As Professor Herbert Wechsler has put it, 'the Court is on 
weakest ground when it opposes its interpretation of the Constitution 
to that of the Congress in the interest of the states, whose 
representatives control the legislative process and by hypothesis have 
broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged act of Congress'. 28 
Despite its age, McCulloch captures better than any other opinion of 
the Court both the broad outlines of contemporary constitutional law 
regarding Congressional power and the techniques of contemporary 
constitutional analysis. Like contemporary constitutional law, it 
purports to recognize judicially enforceable limits upon Congress's 
exercise of its powers. But while the powers are stated clearly and 
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confidently, the limits are stated obscurely, more nearly as a necessary 
concession than as an important concern.29 Marshall's eschewal of 
formalism has an equally contemporaneous ring, and is perhaps of 
greater importance. His conversion of 'powers' into 'objects' is the 
source of the modern Court's practice of viewing the Constitution as 
embodying 'values', not rules. His reliance upon consideration of 
institutional competence, similarly, presages important elements of 
contemporary constitutional analysis. Both are employed by the 
present-day Court, as they were employed by Marshall, to read the 
Constitution with greater concern for the meaning that can be put into 
it than for the meaning that can be drawn from it. 
III. The Commerce Power 
A. DECISIONS PRIOR TO THE 'NEW DEAL' 
Among the discontentments that led to calling the 1787 Convention, 
none was more important than that resulting from the commercial 
rivalries that had developed among the states under the Articles of 
Confederation. The consequence of those rivalries, as reported by 
Albert Beveridge, Marshall's biographer, was the enactment by the 
states of 'tariff laws against one another as well as against foreign 
nations, and indeed as far as commerce was concerned, each State 
treated the other as foreign nations. There were retaliations, dis-
criminations, and every manner of trade restrictions which local in-
genuity and selfishness could devise'. 30 The elimination of these rival-
ries, or at least of the restrictive practices that they had generated, was 
one of the primary tasks of the Convention. 
It is somewhat surprising, therefore, that the Constitution speaks so 
briefly to the subject. Apart from the prohibition of state taxes on 
imports and exports in Article I, Section 10, the only provision of the 
Constitution directed at the problem was Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 
which conferred upon Congress power 'to regulate commerce with 
foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian 
tribes'. The absence of any other provisions dealing with a problem so 
central to the purpose of the Convention strongly suggests that the 
framers thought that Article I, Section 8 was adequate to carry the 
burden of solving it. Nevertheless, if it was not apparent at the time, 
subsequent experience soon demonstrated that the spare language of 
the commerce clause left many questions unanswered. 
The Supreme Court first had occasion to address these questions in 
Gibbons v. Ogden,31 decided in 1824, five years after the decision in 
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McCulloch v. Maryland. Gibbons involved the validity of a New York 
statute that conferred a monopoly to navigate the waters of the state by 
steamboat. The challenge to the statute rested, in part, upon the 
ground that it excluded from New York's waters a vessel that had been 
licensed under an act of Congress. Chief Justice Marshall, who again 
wrote for the Court, took the opportunity to interpret federal power 
expansively. 
He began by rejecting the claim that 'commerce' encompassed only 
the purchase and sale of goods. The regulation of navigation, he 
asserted, was one of the people's primary 'objects' in creating the 
federal government and that government had done so from the time of 
its commencement. To limit the meaning of the word 'commerce' in 
the manner suggested 'would restrict a general term, applicable to 
many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, undoubtedly, is 
traffic, but it is something more,-it is intercourse. It describes the 
commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations in all its 
branches .... '32 
Marshall might well have ended his discussion of the scope of 
federal power at this point, since once it was established that com-
merce included navigation, it was beyond dispute that the federal v1 
licensee, who was navigating between New Jersey and New York, was 
engaged in commerce 'among the several states .. .'. The opinion 
continues at length, however, to consider the meaning of the phrases 
'with foreign nations' and 'among the several states'. The former, 
Marshall wrote, comprehends 'every species of commercial inter-
course between the United States and foreign nations'. The latter 
extends to 'that commerce which concerns more states than one', 
excluding from Congressional control only 'commerce which is 
completely internal [to a state] ... and which does not extend to or 
affect other states'.33 
Significantly, Marshall did not confine Congressional power to 
commerce that crossed state boundaries, but extended it to all com-
merce that 'concerns' or 'affects' more than a single state. The breadth 
of his language in describing the reach of Congress's power plainly was 
not inadvertent. The distribution of authority over commerce between 
the nation and the states, he wrote, conforms to the general design of 
the Constitution. 
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that its 
action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those 
internal concerns which affect the states generally; but not to those which are 
completely within a particular state, which do not affect other states, and 
with which it is not necessary to interfere for the purpose of executing some of 
the general powers of the government. 34 
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Although Gibbons v. Ogden technically respected the theory of 
enumerated powers, it demonstrated-as had McCulloch-that the 
theory was compatible with a very broad view of Congressional 
authority. The enumerated powers, themselves susceptible to very 
expansive interpretation, did not state the outer limits of Con-
gressional power, for Congress could invade the 'reserved' power of 
the states when necessary 'for the purpose of executing some of the 
general powers of the government'. Gibbons followed McCulloch also 
in defining the reach of Congressional power in a way that largely 
excluded the judiciary from enforcing the limits. Its test for deter-
mining whether Congress could justifiably act was a practical one, 
✓ whether more states than one were affected. Such a test, Marshall 
emphasized in Gibbons, as he had in McCulloch, was largely beyond 
judicial competence. Congress's power in relation to the objects 
entrusted to it is, he wrote, 'plenary'. 'The wisdom and the discretion 
of Congress, their indentity with the people, and the influence which 
their Constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many other 
instances ... the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure 
them from its abuse'. 35 
More than a century later, Justice Robert Jackson wrote that 
Marshall's opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden 'described the federal 
commerce power with a breadth never yet exceeded'. 36 Yet, in the 
circumstances of Marshall's time, the test that he established un-
doubtedly left a great deal of economic activity beyond the reach of the 
federal government. The full potential of that test for permitting the 
federal government to displace state power did not become apparent 
until the industrial revolution had taken hold in the United States and 
Congress had begun enacting legislation to deal with its consequences. 
When it did become apparent, beginning in the last decade of the 
nineteenth century, the Supreme Court attempted to define limits to 
Congressional power. 
In United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 37 for example, the Court, 
abandoning the pragmatic approach that Marshall had adopted to 
measure Congress's power, held that an acquisition of four sugar 
refineries which brought 98 per cent of the nation's refinery capacity 
under common control did not violate the Sherman Act's prohibition 
of combinations in restraint of trade. Although the Court's decision 
technically involved only a construction of the statute, the con-
struction was premised upon a narrow conception of Congress's 
power under the commerce clause. Commerce, the Court maintained, 
did not include manufacturing, agriculture, mining, or other pro-
duction activities. Although these activities might affect commerce, 
they did so only 'incidentally and indirectly'. A restraint upon com-
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merce would be only an 'indirect result' of the combination, and 
'however inevitable and whatever its extent ... such [a] result would 
not necessarily determine the object of the ... combination .... ' 
The Court thus departed from Marshall's pragmatic test for deter"I, 
mining Congress's authority under the commerce clause and sub-
stituted one that looked to the 'nature' of the activity to be regulated. 
During the next half-century, the same approach was intermittently 
employed by the Court to invalidate a number of Congressional 
initiatives, including not only statutes that would have regulated 
production but also those that regulated labour relationships.38 
Knight and the cases that followed it have often been criticized for a 
supposed failure to appreciate the realities of modern economic life. 
But Chief Justice Fuller, who wrote for the Court in Knight, was fully 
aware of those realities; indeed, they were the major justification for 
his departure from Gibbons. As Fuller wrote, 'Slight reflection will 
show that if the national power extends to all contracts and com-
binations in manufacture, agriculture, mining, and other productive 
industries, whose ultimate result may affect external commerce, com-
paratively little of business operations and affairs would be left for 
state control'. _.Ih~ cli_sagre_~111e11t between Fuller and his critics,_in other 
words, involved political and constitutional theory, noLpositive 
__ economics. Whether in response to their own political predilections or 
to their understanding of the framers' intentions, Fuller and the justices 
who followed him sought to maintain areas of economic life over 
which the states would exercise exclusive authority. At an earlier time, 
Congress's power to regulate all economic activity affecting interstate 
and foreign commerce could coexist with the retention of such 
authority by the states.lBut in the circumstance of a modern industrial v 
economy, both Fuller Jnd his critics agreed, one or the other would be 
forced to yield. Either the states would lose the exclusive control over 
areas of economic life that they traditionally had exercised or Congress 
would lose the capacity to regulate all economic activity that con-
cerned 'more states than one'. f 
The Court's effort to confirk federal power lasted for more than 
four decades, but the justices never succeeded in developing principles 
that were adequate to the task. As pressures for the extension of the 
federal authority mounted, refinements and inconsistencies developed 
in the Court's decisions. Within the field of transportation, for 
example, the Court permitted Congress to regulate wholly intra-state 
activity because of the_effect_of_the activity on interstate commerce. 
Thus, in the Shreveport Rate case, 39 the Court sustained Congress's 
authority to act against intra-state railroad rates that were discrimina-
torily low in relation to interstate rates that had received federal 
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approval. Precisely why the effect of an intra-state actlVlty upon 
interstate commerce justified federal control of the former in this 
instance, but not in cases involving production activities, was never 
explained. 
In the main, the Court's decisions during this period are of historical 
interest only. Decisions that limited federal power have been over-
ruled; those that sustained federal power have largely been superseded 
by others that give Congress far greater latitude. 40 The major con-
temporary interest of the decisions is in the lesson that they offer 
regarding the difficulty of imposing principled limits upon the power 
of Congress over economic activity. The. inability of the Co.urt.1Q 
J~h.ion..s.ueh principles does oot, of course, dcmonstrate·the-imf>Ossi"-· 
hlfuY. of the task(Ifii!,~ _<:l.oes strongly_s.uggest that couJ:ts cannQt.easily 
escape t_h~.p.ressureuha.uhigh lev~lof ecaoomkintegratiQri g~nerates 
lorT·- in governmental ower from 'l.oca_t .. to 'c:entrar 
~s. If for no ot er reason than that they are members of the 
community, judges are bound to recognize-in some spheres, if not in 
all-that exclusively local control of activities that have community-
wide consequences is unsatisfactory. As judges yield to these per-
ceptions, their ability to maintain principled limits upon the power of 
__ the central authority inevitably diminishes. 
J,, There is one important exception to the proposition that the Court's 
~ decisions during the period from 1895 to 1936 are only of historical 
importance. In a line of decisions beginning with the Lottery case, 41 
the Court held that the plenary power of Congress over interstate 
commerce permitted it to exclude goods and activities from that 
commerce. The consequence was vastly to expand the range of Con-
gress's authority, enabling it not only to exclude from interstate com-
merce products and activities that it considered objectionable but also, 
as an incident of that power, effectively to regulate 'local' activities 
that otherwise would have been beyond its control. 
The Lottery case involved the validity of an 1895 enactment that 
prohibited the interstate transportation of lottery tickets. In upholg_ing 
the st e Cou · he contention that the ower to re u-
ate commerce did not include the power to prohibit it. Congress's 
power over interstate commerce, the Court wrote, is 'plenary 
... and is subject to no limitations except such as may be found in the 
Constitution'. Within the sphere of its competence, the power of 
Congress is as great as that of the states in theirs, and just '[a]s a State 
may, for the purpose of guarding the morals of its own people, forbid 
all sales of lottery tickets within its limits, so Congress, for the purpose 
of guarding the people of the United States against the "widespread 
pestilence of lotteries" and to protect the commerce which concerns all 
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the States, may prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from one State to 
another'. The Lottery case expanded federal legislative authority 
beyond even the broad limits outlined by Marshall. In McCulloch, 
Marshall held that the validity of a statute was to be determined by 
ascertaining whether it was reasonably calculated to advance the 
'objects' with which the federal government had been entrusted. 
'Should Congress', he wrote, 'under the pretext of executing its 
powers, pass laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to 
the government, it would be the painful duty of this tribunal ... to say 
that such an act was not the law of the land'.42 In the Lottery case, 
however, the Court refused to confine Congress to the pursuit of J 
specified objectives, holding that as long as the power it exercised was 
among those specified in the Constitution, the objects it might pursue 
were unlimited. 43 
Congress quickly took advantage of its newly recognized power, 
employing the regulatory technique sanctioned in the Lottery case to 
control conduct that would otherwise have been beyond its reach. One 
year after the decision, it enacted legislation prohibiting the interstate 
shipment of adulterated food. In Hippolite Egg Co. v. United States, 44 
the Court upheld the power of the federal government, acting under 
the legislation, to seize adulterated food that was no longer in inter-
state commerce. Two years later, in Hokev. United States,45 the Court 
sustained federal legislation prohibiting the transportation of women 
in interstate commerce for immoral purposes. And in the same year, in 
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 46 the Court upheld a federal statute that 
imposed retail labelling requirements on goods that had moved in 
interstate commerce. 
The authority of Congress to prohibit interstate commerce, and 
incidentally to condition the movement of persons and goods in such 
commerce,47 permitted a significant expansion of federal power. 
Decisions such as the Lottery case and Hoke v. United States enabled 
Congress to employ the commerce power to achieve non-economic 
objectives. The commerce clause became, in tiffect, a •,rehicle by ,Mhicll 
Con ress ni1ht act in furtherance of moral objectives that tradition-
a ha o e states. 
The legitimacy of using the commerce clause for such ends is a subject 
of continuing controversy,48 but the validity of doing so is firmly 
established. 
Its plenary power over interstate commerce also permitted Congress 
to achieve practical control over economic activities that were not 
independently subject to its regulation. As the economic life of the 
nation became increasingly integrated, restrictions imposed by the 
Congress upon goods moving in interstate commerce became increas-
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ingly difficult to avoid. Congress might, under the doctrine of the 
Knight case, lack authority to regulate production directly, but its 
power to exclude goods that failed to meet specified standards from 
interstate commerce subjected a substantial amount of production to 
its practical control. Few producers, in the twentieth century, could 
forgo the interstate market. In Hammer v. Dagenhart,49 the Court for 
the first time imposed limits upon Congress's power to regulate 
production through its control of the movement of goods in interstate 
commerce, invalidating a statute that prohibited the interstate move-
ment of goods produced by child labour. The Court's efforts to 
distinguish other legislation that it had upheld were patently un-
successful, and commentators have tended to view the decision as 
resting on nothing more than the Court's distaste for labour legisla-
tion. Although the decision stood for some years as an obstacle to the 
enactment of federal child labour laws, and perhaps to other federal 
labour legislation, it lacked generative capacity. The federal govern-
ment, through its plenary power over interstate commerce, continued 
to exercise control over many 'local' activities. 
B. THE MODERN ERA: ABANDONMENT OF JUDICIAL 
LIMITATIONS ON THE COMMERCE POWER 
The Court's efforts to confine federal legislative authority continued 
into the 1930s and eventually produced a constitutional crisis. After 
the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt as President in 1932, Con-
gress responded to the national demand for a solution to the problems 
created by the Great Depression by enacting a series of measures which 
subjected the economy to an unprecedented amount of federal·regula-
tion. By 1937, when Roosevelt commenced his second term in office, 
the Supreme Court had held nearly all these measures unconstitu-
tional. Several of the decisions rested on grounds that seemed effec-
tively to deprive Congress of power to deal with the nation's economic 
problems. 
Of these, three involved the scope of Congressional authority under 
the commerce clause. In Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton Rail-
road Co., 50 the Court invalidated a statute that established a 
compulsory retirement and pension plan for all carriers subject to the 
Interstate Commerce Act. The Court acknowledged Congress's power .J 
to regulate interstate transportation, but held that the statute was 
'really and essentially related solely to the social welfare of the worker' 
and, therefore, that it was 'not in purpose or effect a regulation of 
commerce within the meaning of the Constitution'. In a companion 
case, ~er Poultry Corp. v. United States, 51 the Court invalidated 
the National Industrial Recovery Act, which, inter alia, regulated the 
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wages and hours of the employees of covered employers. Employee 
wages and hours, the Court held, had only an 'indirect' effect upon '-
commerce and were, therefore, beyond the authority oTCongress. A 
similar result was reached the following year in Carter v. Carter Coal 
Co., 52 which invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 
1935. '[T]he effect of the labor provision of the Act ... primarily falls 
upon production and not upon commerce; ... production is a purely 
local activity.' 
The Court's intransigence in maintaining that production and 
labour relations were beyond the authority of Congress not only 
deprived the federal government of power to deal with important 
elements of the nation's economic crisis, it flew in the face of a 
widespread belief that only Congress could deal effectively with the 
nation's economic problems. The states were widely regarded as 
impotent to deal with the problems precisely because they were 
national in scope. Any attempt by a state to regulate wages and hours 
or to control production would, unless all (or at least many) acted in 
concert, merely put it at a competitive disadvantage. In an integrated 
national economy, moreover, price and wage levels or labour unrest in 
any part of the nation produced ripple effects throughout the economy. 
The Court's insistence that production and labour relations wer~ 1 
'local' activities thus seemed to rest upon its failure to understan~ J 
modern economic conditions. 
The practical consequences of the Court's decisions might alone 
have brought it into public disfavour, but dissatisfaction with the 
Court was heightened by the sense that it was the Court, not the 
Constitution, that had created the barriers to effective federal action. 
As legal scholars and government lawyers pointed out, the doctrines 
that the Court employed to limit Congress were not required by the 
language of the Constitution; indeed, doctrines dating back to 
Gibbons v. Ogden might have been employed to sustain Congres-
sional authority. Moreover, since these latter doctrines continued to be 
applied in other contexts, where the Court was more accepting of 
Congressional authority, there seemed ample ground for the suspicion 
that it was the Court's distaste for Congress's economic policies, not a 
coherent doctrine of federal-state relations, that accounted for its 
decisions. 53 
In 1937, shortly after his second election, Roosevelt moved against 
the Court, urging the Congress to enact legislation that would permit 
the appointment of an additional member of the Court for each 
member who had served for ten years and had passed the age of 70. 
Although initially Roosevelt disingenuously justified the proposal as a 
means of enabling the Court to handle its work-load, it was generally 
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understood that his true purpose was to allow the appointment of 
justices whose constitutional views conformed to those of the Presi-
dent and Congress. The 'Court-packing' plan was the first serious 
challenge since Reconstruction to the Court's independence in per-
forming its constitutional function, and as such it was the subject of 
wide and often bitter public debate. Ultimately, the Congress refused 
to adopt it. Before the plan was defeated, however, the Court re-
treated. In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 54 it sustained the National Labor Relations Act, which con-
ferred the right of collective bargaining upon employers engaged in 
occupations 'affecting [interstate] commerce'. Alton, Schechter, and 
Carter were not explicitly overruled. They were, however, largely 
ignored, and it would not have required a very astute observer to 
appreciate that they lacked continuing vitality. 
The decision in Jones & Laughlin marks the abandonment of the 
Court's efforts to impose limits on Congress's power under the com-
merce clause. In every subsequent case in which it has been questioned, 
Congressional authority has been sustained. 55 The range of economic 
activities that the Court has held to be within the commerce power is 
now so broad that a contemporary constitutional lawyer would have 
difficulty identifying any that are not beyond its reach. Congress's 
plenary power over interstate commerce has become, in effect, a 
plenary power over the national economy. 
-£.. The foundations of this new constitutional order are Gibbons v. 
~ Ogden and the Lottery case. Of these, the former has been the more 
significant in extending federal authority over economic activities. As 
the Court recognized as early as the Knight case, unqualified 
acceptance of Marshall's test for measuring Congressional power-
whether the activity regulated 'concerns more states than one'-leaves 
little if any economic activity beyond the authority of Congress. By 
returning to Marshall's empirical approach, and abandoning the con-
ceptual limits that Knight, Hammer v. Dagenhart, and the Depression 
era cases imposed upon it, the Court has freed Congress to adopt 
whatever economic measures it considers necessary in the interest of 
the national economy. 
The breadth of Congressional power to regulate activities affecting 
interstate commerce has diminished the importance of its power to 
exclude goods and activities from interstate commerce. In recent years, 
the latter has been important primarily in enabling Congress to legi-
slate for non-economic objectives. At times, however, Congress has 
employed its power to prohibit interstate commerce in pursuit of 
economic objectives, generally when it wishes to refrain from exercis-
ing all its constitutional authority. But in a few instances, the technique 
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of prohibiting certain types of interstate commerce has been used in 
combination with Congress's power to regulate activities affecting 
commerce in order to achieve a result that conceivably could not have 
been reached by the latter alone. 
1. The Scope of the Power to Regulate Activities Affecting Interstate 
Commerce 
The precise question in Jones & Laughlin was whether Congress could 
regulate labour relations at a manufacturing plant owned by a fully 
integrated steel company. The case was an ideal one for demonstrating 
the artificiality of the concepts that the Court had formulated to limit 
Congressional power over the economy. At the time of the decision, 
Jones & Laughlin was the nation's fourth largest steel producer. It 
owned and operated not only plants for producing steel but ore, coal, 
and limestone properties; extensive land and water transportation 
facilities; fabricating plants; warehouses; and sales offices throughout 
the United States and in Canada. Approximately 75 per cent of its 
product was shipped out of Pennsylvania, where its steel-producing 
plants were located. 
In sustaining Congress's power to regulate labour relations at these 
plants, the Court employed language whose breadth approached that 
of Gibbons v. Ogden: 
The fundamental principle is that the power to regulate commerce is the 
power to enact 'all appropriate legislation' for 'its protection and advance-
ment'; to adopt measures 'to promote its growth and insure its safety'; 'to 
foster, protect, control and restrain.' ... That power is plenary and may be 
exerted to protect interstate commerce 'no matter what the source of the 
danger which threatens it'. . . . Although activities may be intrastate in 
character when separately considered, if they have such a close and sub-
stantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or 
appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Con-
gress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control. 56 
The question whether the company's labour relations affected 
interstate commerce, the Court continued, could not be considered 'in 
an intellectual vacuum'. In view of 'its far-flung activities', industrial 
strife at its plant 'would have a most serious effect on interstate 
commerce'. 'When industries organize themselves on a national scale, 
making their relations to interstate commerce the dominant factor in 
their activities, how can it be maintained that their industrial labor 
relations constitute a forbidden field into which Congress may not 
enter when it is necessary to protect interstate commerce from the 
paralyzing consequences of industrial war?'57 
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Although the opinion emphasized Jones & Laughlin's size and 
integrated character, another decision the same day and several others 
handed down within the year revealed that these factors were not 
controlling. In each, the Court upheld the application of the National 
Labor Relations Act to a small company, engaged only in production, 
solely upon a showing that it processed raw materials from, or shipped 
its product to, another state.58 Several years later, in Wickard v. 
Filburn, 59 the Court went even further, sustaining the power of 
Congress to regulate agricultural production that was not intended for 
interstate commerce, indeed, not intended for commerce at all. The 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 imposed quotas on the pro-
duction of wheat that were applicable whether the wheat was intended 
for sale or for consumption on the farm. Appellee, who had exceeded 
the quota, sought to avoid the penalty that had been imposed upon 
him, contending that Congress lacked authority to restrict production 
intended for domestic consumption. The Court held that appellee's 
purpose in producing the wheat was immaterial: 
That an activity is of local character may help in a doubtful case to determine 
whether Congress intended to reach it .... But even if appellee's activity be 
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever 
its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on 
interstate commerce, and this irrespective of whether such effect is what 
might at some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect'.60 
Nor was the Court troubled by the fact that appellee's production 
was minuscule in relation to the interstate wheat market. Congress's 
power, it held, was determined by the aggregate effect of activities 
like those of appellee. 'That appellee's own contribution to the 
demand for wheat may be trivial by itself is not enough to remove him 
from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, 
taken together \\'ith that of many others similarly situated, is far from 
trivial. '61 
In the years since Wickard v. Filburn, Congress has frequently relied 
upon the 'aggregate effect' principle and the Court has continued to 
employ it in sustaining legislation. In Perez v. United States, 62 for 
instance, the Court was faced with a challenge to a federal statute that 
imposed criminal penalties upon 'extortionate credit transactions'-
transactions involving, for example, the threat of violence to collect 
debts. Petitioner, who had been convicted under the statute, asserted 
that it exceeded Congress's authority under the commerce clause. 
Although the Act was not limited to transactions affecting interstate 
·commerce and no proof was offered that petitioner's conduct was in 
any way connected with interstate commerce, the Court sustained 
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Congress's authority, relying upon evidence before the Congress that 
extortionate credit transactions were a significant source of revenue 
for 'organized crime' and were used by it to finance its interstate 
activities. The failure to establish any connection between petitioner 
and interstate commerce was held to be irrelevant: 'Where the class of 
activities is regulated and that class is within the reach of federal 
power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual 
instances of the class.' 
Perez demonstrates not only the breadth of Congressional authority 
under the prevailing interpretation of the commerce clause, 63 but the 
consensus that supports that interpretation. Only one member of the 
Court, Justice Stewart, dissented. 64 Eight members of the Court thus 
voted to sustain Congressional power in a case in which there was not 
the slightest evidence that interstate commerce had been affected, even 
in the smallest degr~e. 
2. Congressional Control Over Goods and Activities in Interstate 
Commerce 
During the same period in which the Court has expanded Congress's 
power to regulate activities affecting interstate commerce, it has 
removed whatever limits Hammer v. Dagenhart imposed upon 
Congressional power to regulate the movement of goods and persons 
in interstate commerce. In the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 
Congress prohibited the shipment in interstate commerce of goods 
produced by employees whose wages and hours failed to meet federal 
standards. It also prohibited 'production of goods for [interstate] 
commerce' except in compliance with those standards. Both pro-
visions were unanimously sustained in United States v. Darby.65 In 
upholding the former provision, the Court relied upon the line of 
decisions commencing with the Lottery case and expressly overruled 
Hammer v. Dagenhart. Congress is, the Court said, free to follow its 
own conception of public policy in determining whether goods should 
be excluded from interstate commerce. Congress had determined that 
interstate commerce should not be made the instrument of competition in the 
distribution of goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which 
competition is injurious to the commerce and to the states from and to which 
the commerce flows. The motive and purpose of a regulation of interstate 
commerce are matters for the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which 
the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no 
control.66 
The Act's direct regulation of goods produced for interstate com-
merct; was sustained on the different theory that Congress had power 
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to control production as a means of effectuating its decision to exclude 
the offending goods from interstate commerce. Since Congress had 
excluded from interstate commerce all goods not produced in accor-
dance with the labour standards it had established, the Court held, it 
might adopt any 'means reasonably adapted' to enforcing the ex-
clusion. Just as Congress might regulate intra-state railroad rates as a 
means of effectuating its regulation of interstate rates, 67 so might 
Congress regulate production for interstate commerce in aid of its 
policy of excluding from that commerce goods that had not been 
produced in accordance with federal labour standards. 
The Court's argument in this respect has been criticized as 'boot-
strapping' that it permits Congress-by the simple expedient of ex-
cluding goods from interstate commerce and then prohibiting the 
production of the goods-to regulate intra-state activities even though 
no effect upon interstate commerce has been demonstrated. 68 In view 
of the broad range of activities that have been held to affect interstate 
commerce, however, it is difficult to imagine what activities are 
brought within Congress's power by Darby that would not otherwise 
be subject to its authority. Indeed, the Court in Darby offered the 
'affecting commerce' rationale as an alternative theory for sustaining 
the statute's provisions regarding 'production for commerce'. Among 
the evils aimed at by the Act, it said, was the 'dislocation' of interstate 
commerce 'caused by the impairment or destruction of local business 
by competition ... '. The means adopted by Congress to protect inter-
state commerce, suppressing the production of goods produced under 
substandard labour conditions, 'is so related to that commerce and so 
affects it as to be within the reach of the commerce power'. 
In Darby, Congress employed its power to exclude goods from 
interstate commerce to regulate production. Other cases demonstrate 
that the power may also be employed as a means of regulating activi-
ties after interstate shipment has ended. In United States v. Sullivan, 69 
for example, the Court sustained application of the labelling pro-
visions of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 to a retail 
sale. Defendant, a retail druggist in Georgia, had purchased a properly-
labelled 1,000-tablet bottle of sulfathiazole from a. Georgia whole-
saler, who in turn had obtained it from a supplier in another state some 
months earlier. Several months after his purchase, defendant made 
two retail sales of twelve tablets each, transferring the tablets to bottles 
that were not properly labelled under the federal act. The Court 
summarily rejected defendant's contention that the transactions were 
beyond the reach of Congress under the commerce clause. Neither the 
fact that the tablets were no longer in the original container nor the fact 
that defendant had acquired them from a local supplier deprived 
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Congress of power over the transaction. 
In reaching this result, the Court placed primary reliance upon 
McDermott v. Wisconsin, 70 which had held that Congress might 
directly control retail labelling as a means of enforcing its policy of 
excluding mislabelled products from interstate commerce. Signifi-
cantly, however, the Court also cited Wickard v. Filburn, thereby 
indicating that Congress's authority over defendant's sales might also 
be derived from its power to regulate activities affecting commerce. 
Sullivan thus reinforces the suggestion made earlier, that Congress's 
power to regulate activities 'affecting commerce' now confers so com-
prehensive a power over economic activities that it need no longer rely 
upon its power to reach 'local' activities indirectly through its power to 
exclude goods from interstate commerce. Further support for that 
suggestion may be found in Maryland v. Wirtz, 71 which sustained an 
amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act substantially broaden-
ing its coverage. As originally enacted and upheld in Darby, the Act 
regulated only the w;iges and hours of employees 'engaged in com-
merce or in the production of goods for commerce'. The amendment 
sustained in Wirtz extended the coverage of the Act to all employees of 
'an enterprise engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for 
commerce'. Justice Harlan, writing for the Court, thought it obvious 
that Congress had a basis for concluding that the wages and hours of 
all employees of such employers, not just those who were themselves 
engaged in commerce or in production for commerce, 'affected inter-
state commerce'. 
3. The Commerce Power and Non-Economic Objectives 
Since the decision in the Lottery case, Congress has often relied upon 
its power over commerce to pursue non-economic objectives. Most 
frequently, such legislation rests upon Congress's power to exclude 
goods and activities from interstate commerce. 72 With the expansion 
of federal power to regulate activities affecting interstate commerce, it 
is clear that Congress can, if it wishes to do so, significantly expand the 
coverage of most of such legislation. The statute sustained in Perez 
offers a striking illustration of the possibilities. 
Another and more important illustration is provided by the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964. Title II of that Act prohibited racial dis-
crimination, with minimal exceptions, in any 'inn, hotel, motel or 
other establishment which provides lodging to transient guests'. In 
Heart of Atlanta Mo'tel v. United States, 73 a unanimous Supreme 
Court sustained Congress's power to enact the prohibition under the 
commerce clause. Congress had, the Court said, ample evidence that 
racial discrimination in transient lodging impeded interstate travel 
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by blacks. Even if the operation of a hotel or motel were to be 
characterized as a local activity, therefore, Congress might regulate it 
because of its effect upon interstate travel. Nor was it material that 
Congress was legislating against moral wrongs. Once the burden upon 
commerce was established, 'Congress was not restricted by the fact 
that the particular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it 
was dealing was also deemed a moral and social wrong.' 
On the same day, in Katzenbach v. McClung,74 the Court also 
sustained, again unanimously, a provision of the Act that prohibited 
racial discrimination in any 'restaurant ... principally engaged in 
selling food for consumption on the premises' if 'it serves or offers to 
serve interstate travellers or a substantial portion of the food it serves 
... has moved in [interstate] commerce'. Congress had, the Court said, 
ample evidence to justify a conclusion that racial discrimination in 
restaurants impeded interstate travel by blacks and, by reducing their 
opportunities to purchase goods, reduced the flow of merchandise in 
interstate commerce. 'In addition, there were many references to 
discriminatory situations causing wide unrest and having a depressant 
effect on general business conditions in the respective communities.' 
The Court's rationale was, plainly, broad enough to sustain legislation 
broader than that enacted by the Congress. If Congress was authorized 
to prohibit racial discrimination because of its depressing economic 
effects and because of its tendency to reduce purchases from out-of-
state suppliers, then any restaurant might have been made subject to 
the Act. 
4. Continuing Effects of the Federalist Tradition 
Judicial decisions since 1937 established that Congress, in the exercise 
of its authority over foreign and interstate commerce, has plenary 
power over the national economy. Although some opinions contain 
language suggesting that there are limits to the commerce power, the 
results that the Court has reached and the theories it has advanced in 
support of those results cannot easily be reconciled with that con-
clusion. Nevertheless, the notion that there are limits to the commerce 
power persists and at times appears to exert an influence upon both 
Congress and the Court. 
In a number of cases, the Court has construed ambiguous federal 
regulations so as to exclude from their coverage conduct that has 
traditionally been within the domain of the states. 75 Congress, the 
Court has said, 'will not be deemed to have significantly changed the 
federal-state balance' unless it 'conveys its purpose clearly'. More 
strikingly, the Court has employed the same principle in refusing to 
apply a statute according to its literal terms. A 1951 statute prohibited 
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the shipment of gambling devices in interstate commerce and imposed 
incidental reporting obligations on 'every manuacturer and dealer in 
gambling devices'. The government maintained that the statute should 
be applied literally. Relying on decisions such as Darby and Sullivan, it 
argued that Congress might constitutionally require reporting of 
wholly intra-state transactions 'to make effective the prohibition of 
transportation in interstate commerce'. Defendant maintained that 
such a reading of the statute would extend it beyond Congress's 
power. In United States v. Five Gambling Devices, 76 the Court 
declined to reach the constitutional issue, intimating that it was not 
without difficulty. It held, instead, that the statute should not be 
construed to govern wholly intra-state transactions: 
We do not question that literal language of this Act is capable of the broad, 
unlimited construction urged by the Government. Indeed, if it were enacted 
for a unitary system of government, no other construction would be appro-
priate. But we must assume that the implications and limitations of our 
federal system constitute a major premise of all congressional legislation, 
though not repeatedly recited therein. Against the background of our tradi-
tion and system of government, we cannot say that the lower courts, which 
have held as a matter of statutory construction that this Act does not reach 
purely intrastate matters, have not made a permissible interpretation. We 
find in the text no unmistakable intention of Congress to raise the con-
stitutional questions implicit in the Government's effort to apply the Act in its 
most extreme impact upon affairs considered normally reserved to the 
states. 77 
The Court's occasional intimations that there are limits to the 
commerce power are reinforced by the effort it makes when legislation 
is sustained to demonstrate that the conduct regulated has some 
connection with interstate commerce. Since there would be no need for 
such a demonstration if Congress had plenary authority over the 
national economy, as it would in a unitary system, there is an implica-
tion that Congress's powers are not unlimited. Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to imagine any regulation of economic activity that would be 
held by the Court to be beyond Congress's power under the commerce 
clause if Congress stated its purpose clearly and firmly. 
Accordingly, the persistence of the notion that Congress's powers 
are not unlimited is important primarily for the effect that it has upon 
Congress. An examination of its debates suggests that Congress takes 
seriously the notion th~t there are limits to its power. Although it 
seems never in recent years to have drawn back from enacting legis-
lation because of doubts about its authority under the commerce 
clause, it has on occasion debated whether particular legislation would 
exceed its power and has, as in the legislation at issue in Perez, at times 
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been careful to develop evidence concerning the relationship between 
interstate commerce and the activities it seeks to regulate. 
Were these the only manifestations of Congress's concern for the 
limits of its power, one might conclude that it is merely playing out 
a ritual from which all significance has been drained. Congress does, 
however, often restrict the coverage of legislation to situations in 
which there is a demonstrable nexus between the activity regulated 
and interstate commerce. It may be, therefore, that the ritual serves to 
remind Congress of the nation's federal tradition and thereby tempers 
its tendency to view any significant problem as an appropriate subject 
of national legislation. But if, as some students of constitutional law 
believe, the ritual does have such an effect, its influence is limited 
to legislation that is not primarily concerned with economic objectives. 
In the areas of economic regulation, Congress has during the past 
several decades behaved as though it were the legislature of a unitary 
nation. Virtually any problem that is thought to be an appropriate 
concern of government is also considered an appropriate subject of 
federal legislation. 
IV. The Spending Power78 
The federal government currently spends in excess of $500 billion (i.e. 
$500,000 millions) annually, of which more than 75 per cent is spent 
for domestic purposes. Its expenditures support the full range of 
activities that have been undertaken by governments in modern in-
dustrial society. The major part of the federal government's domestic 
budget is allocated to programmes operated directly by it. For 
example, it operates a system of Old Age and Survivors Insurance; 79 it 
maintains a system of national parks;80 it has assumed responsibility 
for important areas oflaw enforcement;81 and it administers a number 
of programmes concerned with the provision of medical care. 82 
A significant part of the federal budget is devoted to support of 
programmes administered by state and local governments. In recent 
years, these subventions have amounted to approximately 20 per cent 
of all state and local expenditures and more than 50 per cent of the 
expenditures of some municipalities. A portion of the funds that state 
and local governments receive from the federal government are 
'general purpose' grants with very few conditions attached to their 
expenditure. Most federal subventions, however, are 'categorical 
grants', i.e. they may be used only for the purposes specified. Grants 
of this type often require compliance with very detailed conditions. 
Several hundred such grant-in-aid programmes are currently in effect, 
influencing almost every area of state and local activity. 
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Although both the absolute amount and the relative importance of 
federal expenditures for domestic purposes have increased signifi-
cantly during the twentieth century, especially during the past forty 
years, the spending power has been an important instrument of 
national policy from the beginning of the nation's history. And from 
the beginning, almost until the present time, questions have been 
raised about whether the purposes of a proposed expenditure were 
properly of federal concern. Not infrequently, the question has been 
cast in constitutional terms. But despite the general truth of de 
Tocqueville's observation that '[s]carcely any political question arises 
in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial 
question',83 the Courts have had almost no influence upon Congress's 
use of the spending power to effect national policies. A brief review of 
the debate surrounding the spending power may, therefore, serve as a 
useful antidote to the tendency to suppose that constitutional develop-
ment in the United States is solely in the hands of the courts. 
The central question in constitutional terms arises from the 
traditional arid still prevalent theory that the United States is a govern-
ment of enumerated powers. Controversy has centred upon the proper 
interpretation of the first clause of Article I, Section 8, of the Con-
stitution: 'The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes, 
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the 
common defense and general welfare of the United States; but all 
duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United 
States.' More specifically, debate has focused upon the breadth of 
federal power to 'provide for the ... general welfare of the United 
States'. 
A possible reading, but one that has never gained broad acceptance, 
would treat the phrase as authorizing Congress to exercise the full 
array of legislative power in pursuit of what it determined to be the 
general welfare. Although the possibility of such an interpretation was 
urged by opponents of the Constitution when it was before the country 
for ratification, it was promptly repudiated by those who favoured 
adoption. 84 Purely· as a matter of textual analysis, the inclusion of the 
phrase between two phrases concerned only with the power of taxa-
tion suggests that so broad an interpretation is unwarranted. Of more 
importance, the subsequent enumeration of powers in Article I, 
Section 8-embodying the general understanding that Congress was 
not to possess plenary legislative power-would be pointless if the 
'general welfare' clause were to be read as conferring virtually com-
plete legislative power upon Congress. 85 In consequence, it has been 
generally accepted that the 'general welfare' clause is to be read as a 
qualification of Congressional taxing power, i.e. that Congress may 
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lay taxes (and by almost unavoidable implication expend the pro-
ceeds) to provide for the general welfare. 86 
The question remains, what is the 'general welfare'? Although 
numerous variations have been suggested, basically two theories have 
competed for acceptance. By the broader view, commonly associated 
with its initial proponent, Alexander Hamilton: 'The only qualifica-
tion of the generality of the phrase in question which seems to be 
admissible, is this: That the object to which an appropriation of money 
is to be made be general, and not local; its operation extending in fact 
or by possibility throughout the Union, and not being confined to a 
particular spot.'87 A second and more confining interpretation, 
traditionally associated with Madison, would limit Congressional 
power under the 'general welfare' clause to spending in aid of the 
powers enumerated in the remainder of Article I, Section 8, and 
elsewhere in the Constitution. Under current, expansive inter-
pretations of these powers, the practical difference between the two 
theories may be insignificant, but the constitutional basis for federal 
subventions was debated and determined at a time when these powers 
were interpreted less generously than they are now. During much of 
the nineteenth century, accordingly, the 'general welfare' clause was, 
as the 'commerce' clause was to become at a later date, the focal point 
of debate over the appropriate role of the federal government in the life 
of the nation. Proponents of the Hamiltonian position relied mainly 
upon the literal meaning of the language of the clause and, increasingly 
as time went on, upon the established practice of Congress. Adherents 
of the narrower view, as might be anticipated, relied chiefly upon the 
dangers of a concentration of power in the federal government. 88 
Although controversy over the interpretation to be given the 
'general welfare' clause continued throughout the nineteenth century 
and into the twentieth, the necessity for a definitive resolution was 
avoided for a time by reliance upon Congressional 'power to dispose of 
... the territory or other property belonging to the United States' 
under Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, as the authority for land grants to 
the states. Since such grants were the characteristic form of federal 
subventions during the nineteenth century,89 and since the federal 
government was directly engaged in few, if any, activities that were not 
clearly of federal concern, questions concerning the scope of the 
'general welfare' clause might be avoided to the extent that Article IV, 
Section 3, provided the necessary authority. Although significant dis-
sents were occasionally expressed, notably by Presidents Jackson, 
Pierce, and Buchanan in messages accompanying vetoes of land grants 
for education and welfare, it appears to have become generally 
accepted, not later than the adoption of the Morrill Act in 1862, that 
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federal land or proceeds from the sale of such land might be granted to 
the states for the 'common benefit'.90 
Acceptance of Congressional authority under Article IV, Section 3, 
despite continuing controversy over the meaning of the 'general wel-
fare' clause seems anomalous in at least two respects. A portion of the 
land granted to the states was acquired, prior to the adoption of the 
Constitution, by cession from several of the states. With respect to 
such land, it seems fair, as Burdick argues, to interpret Article IV, 
Section 3, 'in furtherance of the trust expressly assumed when the 
territory was ceded, namely to dispose of it for the common benefit'. 91 
Much of the land granted by Congress to the states, however, was 
acquired by purchase with funds obtained from taxation. The reason 
why Congress should have had greater power to dispose of those lands 
than to dispose of the funds with which they were purchased seems 
never to have been carefully considered. 92 Additionally, since Article 
IV, Section 3, authorizes disposition of 'territory or other property', 
presumably including money, it is far from clear why that clause 
should be deemed adequate to authorize land grants but not cash 
subventions. 
In any event, replacement of land grants by monetary grants as the 
principal form of federal financial assistance to the states was 
accompanied by renewed interest in the extent of Congressional 
power under the 'general welfare' clause. Yet, as a practical matter, it 
seems fair to conclude that Congress and the President, so far as it was 
within their power to do so, had during the nineteenth century deter-
mined the question in favour of the Hamiltonian position. Funds were 
regularly appropriated in pursuit of objects which, under inter-
pretations of the Constitution then current, were clearly beyond 
federal regulatory power. The Department of Agriculture, for 
example, was established in 1862 and the year following funds were 
appropriated for its use for the study, among other matters, of plant 
and animal diseases, insect pests, and the adulteration of food. Even 
prior to that time, Congress had appropriated funds for the collection 
of agricultural statistics, the distribution of seeds and other purposes 
related to agriculture. Monetary grants in support of programmes to 
be conducted at land-grant colleges established under the Morrill Act 
were commenced in 1887 with annual appropriations for 'agricultural 
experiment stations', and in 1900 annual appropriations were 
authorized for the general support of those institutions. In these and 
numerous other enactments, the political branches of the government 
evidenced acceptance of the broad interpretation of the 'general 
welfare' clause. The Supreme Court, however, had yet to be heard 
from. 
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The issue was squarely presented to the Court in 1923 in actions by 
the state of Massachusetts and a federal taxpayer, challenging the 
validity of a 1921 statute authorizing grants to states for maternal and 
child health programmes. Both suits were dismissed by the Supreme 
Court without consideration of the constitutional issue: the taxpayer's 
suit for lack of standing and the state's for failure to present a justici-
able controversy. 93 The state's suit, the Court concluded, amounted to 
no more than a 'naked contention that Congress has usurped the 
reserved powers of the several States by the mere enactment of the 
statute, though nothing has been done and nothing is to be done 
without their consent; and it is plain that that question, as it is thus 
presented, is political and not judicial in character'. 94 Neither the 
asserted motive of Congress 'to induce the states to yield a portion of 
their reserved rights' nor the allegation that 'the burden of the appro-
priation falls unequally upon the several States' was adequate to create 
a justiciable controversy. The burden of taxation falls not upon the 
states but upon their inhabitants,95 the Court said, and the allegedly 
unlawful Congressional 'purpose' may be effectively frustrated by 'the 
simple expedient of not yielding'. 
The decision in Massachusetts v. Mellon would seem effectively to 
insulate questions concerning the legitimacy of federal grant-in-aid 
programmes from judicial scrutiny, leaving such questions with Con-
gress and the President where they had been for well over a century. In 
large measure, that is precisely what has occurred. But, as though de 
Tocqueville were not to be denied, the issue finally arose in a context 
which, in the Court's view, was appropriate for judicial consideration. 
Congress, in 1933, enacted the Agricultural Adjustment Act to raise 
the price of specified agricultural commodities by reducing the farm 
surplus. The Act authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to contract 
with farmers to reduce acreage or production in return for rental or 
benefit payments. Funds for these payments were to be raised by a tax 
upon processors of the particular commodity. In United States v. 
Butler,96 the receiver of a cotton processor from whom the United 
States sought to collect the tax challenged the entire programme as 
beyond the power of the federal government, squarely raising the 
question of the extent of Congressional power under the 'general 
welfare' clause. 97 
The Court, noting that the issue had not previously been decided by 
it, with little discussion and no analysis adopted the Hamiltonian 
position. But what the Court gave with one hand, it quickly took away 
with the other, for it held that the Act invaded 'the reserved rights of the 
states', thereby violating the Tenth Amendment. The question whether 
an appropriation in aid of agriculture was for the 'general welfare' was 
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expressly pretermitted: the vice of the Act, in the Court's view, lay in 
another direction. It was, the Court said, 'a statutory plan to regulate 
and control agricultural production, a matter beyond the powers 
delegated to the federal government'. 
Butler is reminiscent of Hammer v. Dagenhart. Both sought to limit 
federal power by looking through the form of legislation to its true 
objective. And like Hammer v. Dagenhart, Butler was swept away in 
the Court's volte-face following the 'Court-packing plan'. Although 
the decision has never been expressly overruled, there is no doubt that, 
except in so far as it provides judicial confirmation of the broad 
construction of the 'general welfare' clause, it lacks continuing signi-
ficance. As a restriction upon federal power, indeed, much of its 
vitality was sapped within a year by Steward Machine Co. v. Davis98 
and Helvering v. Davis,99 which upheld provisions of the Social 
Security Act establishing an unemployment insurance programme and 
a programme of old-age insurance. Both decisions stressed that the 
problems to which the legislation was addressed were national in 
scope, that the states alone were not capable of dealing with them, and 
that, Congress has broad discretion to define the 'general welfare'. 
Steward Machine and Helvering v. Davis did suggest two limitations 
on the spending power: first, that expenditures must be for the general 
welfare and not merely for local benefit; and, second, that Congress 
might lack authority to condition its expenditures upon compliance 
with requirements that were unrelated to the purpose of the expendi-
tures or to other legitimate national objectives. Justiciability doctrines 
have tended to prevent challenges on the former ground. In the few 
cases in which such challenges have occurred, the Supreme Court has 
deferred to Congressional judgment.100 Madison's prediction that the 
acceptance of Hamilton's broad reading of the 'general welfare' clause 
would have the effect of excluding the judicial authority 'from its 
participation in guarding the boundaries between the general and the 
State Governments .. .' has proved entirely accurate. 
The Supreme Court has had no occasion to consider a challenge on 
the latter ground. Despite the many and varying conditions imposed 
by the Congress on conditional subventions, the range of legitimate 
federal concerns-as defined by Congress's legislative authority-is 
now so broad that it seems unlikely a successful challenge could be 
made. 
Congress's authority to appropriate funds for the general welfare 
enables it to wield considerable influence upon the activities of state 
and local governments. By the use of 'matching' grants, it can alter 
state and local budgetary priorities, leading state and local 
governments to spend their revenues for purposes quite different from 
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those that they would choose on their own. In addition, Congress's 
power to condition grants upon compliance with the requirements it 
has established perrriits it to influence the internal affairs of state and 
local governments. During the past forty years, Congress has used that 
power frequently to promote the efficiency and fair administration of 
the many state and local activities that are supported partly through 
federal subventions. It has mandated organizational structures, 
personnel policies, and procedures for state and local programmes 
receiving federal funds. Not surprisingly, state and local governments 
have often resented such requirements as unwarranted intrusions into 
their internal affairs. By and large, the tensions that they generate have 
been dealt with at a political level. The one attempt by a state to obtain 
constitutional protection was unsuccessful. In Oklahoma v. Civil 
Service Commission, 101 the state challenged the validity of a federal 
statute that prohibited any state or local official 'whose principal 
employment is in connection with any activity ... financed in whole or 
in part by loans or grants made by the United States' from taking 'any 
active part in political management or political campaign'. Federal 
officials, acting pursuant to the legislation, ordered the state to 
discharge a member of the state highway commission who had 
violated the provision. The legislation provided that if the state failed 
to comply with the order, an amount equal to twice the offending 
official's annual compensation was to be withheld from grants due to 
the state. In sustaining the statute, the Court stressed that the 
requirement imposed by Congress served a national interest in 
securing 'better public service' by those administering federal funds. It 
also emphasized that the case did not require a determination whether 
the federal government could force the official to be removed. The 
state might, as it had, retain the official and merely suffer the reduction 
of the grant. 
On the facts before the Court, the penalty stipulated by the legisla-
tion was sufficiently small for incurring it to be a realistic alternative 
for the state. In general, however, the threat of withholding funds gives 
the federal government sufficient leverage for the states to be effec-
tively required to comply with the conditions it imposes. 
V. The Tenth Amendment as a Protection of State Autonomy 
In a recent decision, National League of Cities v. Usery, 102 the Court 
held that the Tenth Amendment offers the states some protection 
against federal regulation of their internal affairs. The decision breaks 
with a substantial body of precedent and, as a consequence, the 
contours of the immunity it establishes are still highly uncertain. One 
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may find in the opinion the seeds of constitutional protection for a 
broad area of state and local autonomy. Conversely, Usery may be no 
more than an aberration, destined to be confined to its facts and 
perhaps ultimately overruled as inconsistent with the course of con-
stitutional development. An effort to assess the likelihood of these 
possibilities, or of the further possibility that the Court will be able to 
fashion a stable intermediate position, would unduly lengthen this 
study and would, in any event, be highly speculative. Accordingly, in 
the following paragraphs I shall attempt only to put the decision in 
some perspective and to suggest some of the issues that it raises. 
The Constitution does not in terms immunize either state or federal 
governments from taxation or regulation by the other. The notion 
that such immunities are none the less implicit in the Constitution 
originates with Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch v. 
Maryland. In holding that the federal government was immune from 
taxation by the states, Marshall intimated that the states might not 
enjoy a reciprocal immunity from federal taxation, 103 but since the 
latter question was not before him, he left it undecided. Subsequent 
decisions held that the states did have such an immunity and extended 
it very broadly to include, for example, the income of state employees 
and interest on state indebtedness. In the late 1930s, however, the 
Court receded from its earlier positions, holding that income derived 
from the states could be taxed by the federal government. Subsequent 
decisions permitted the federal government to levy a tax upon at least 
some state activities. These decisions left unclear the limits of federal 
power to tax state activities, or even whether there were such limits. 
Each of the cases decided by the Court involved taxes upon state 
commercial activities. Some members of the Court thought such taxes 
valid as long as they did not discriminate against the state, i.e. as long 
as they were also imposed on private entities engaged in the activity. 
Others maintained that Congress could impose a tax directly upon the 
states as long as the activities taxed were not uniquely govern-
mental. 104 But since Congress has not levied any taxes that transgress 
either principle, the limits of its power have remained uncertain. 105 
With but a few exceptions, 106 the question whether Congress, acting 
under the commerce power and other enumerated powers, could 
regulate state activities did not reach the Court until it had receded 
from its extreme position on state tax immunities. Since the 1930s, 
until Usery, the Court has consistently upheld such regulations with-
out regard to whether the activities were 'uniquely governmental' .107 
In Maryland v. Wirtz, for example, the Court sustained an amendment 
to the Fair Labor Standards Act that extended wage and hour regula-
tions to certain state employees. Once it was established that the 
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regulated activities affected interstate commerce, the Court said, it was 
'not tenable' to argue that Congress's control over interstate com-
merce 'must yield to state sovereignty in the performance of govern-
mental functions'. In exercising its powers, the federal government 
'may override countervailing state interests whether these be described 
as "governmental" or "proprietary in character'". 
Following the decision in Wirtz, Congress again amended the Fair 
Labor Standards Act, this time extending its coverage to nearly all state 
and local employees. In Usery, a closely divided Court overruled Wirtz 
and held the amendment unconstitutional as an intrusion upon state 
sovereignty. Conceding that the amendment came within the com-
merce power, the Court concluded that it none the less violated a 
constitutional policy, embodied in the Tenth Amendment, that 'Con-
gress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' 
integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system'. 108 
To subject state and local governments to federal wage and hour 
regulations would 
interfere with the integral governmental functions of these bodies .... [Their 
application will] significantly alter or displace the States' abilities to structure 
employer-employee relationships in such areas as fire prevention, police 
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation .... [I]t is 
functions such as these which governments are created to provide, services 
such as these which the States have traditionally afforded their citizens. If 
Congress may withdraw from the States the authority to make those funda-
mental employment decisions upon which their systems for performance of 
these functions must rest, we think there would be little left of the States' 
'separate and independent existence' .109 
Accordingly, the Court concluded, '[t]his exercise of Congressional 
authority does not comport with the federal system of government 
embodied in the Constitution'. 
The Court's decision raises more questions than it answers. Prior to 
Usery, it had been conventional learning that, as stated in United 
States v. Darby, the Tenth 'Amendment states nothing but a truism 
that all is retained [by the states] which has not been surrendered'. In 
holding that the amendment is now to be given substantive meaning, 
the Court thus sets sail in uncharted waters. All that can be done here is 
to identify some of the questions that the Court will be required to 
consider. 
A. DOES THE TENTH AMENDMENT LIMIT CONGRESS'S 
POWER TO REGULATE PRIVATE CONDUCT? 
In Usery, the Court was careful to confine its decision to the regulation 
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of state activities. 'It is one thing to recognize the authority of Congress 
to enact laws regulating individual businesses necessarily subject to the 
dual sovereignty of the government of the Nation and of the State in 
which they reside. It is quite anothq to uphold a similar exercise of 
congressional authority directed, not to private citizens, but to the 
States as States.'110 But, as Professor Laurence Tribe has argued, if the 
decision signals an attempt to protect 'those functions most essential to 
the continued significance of the states as governmental entities ... it is 
difficult to justify the Court's willingness to protect the state in its role 
as an employer and provider of services and not in its role as lawmaker 
and regulator of private conduct'. 111 It remains to be seen whether the 
Court can maintain so tenuous a line. 
B. WHICH STATE ACTIVITIES WILL BE CONSIDERED 
'INTEGRAL GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS'? 
The Court was careful to preserve the authority of a number of its prior 
decisions upholding federal regulation of state activities that it now 
characterized as not 'integral' to the states' governmental functions. It 
remains unclear, however, how it is to be determined which state 
activities do involve 'integral' governmental functions. For example, is 
the test one of tradition, that the states have 'always' performed the 
activity; or does the characterization of the states' activity depend 
upon whether it is also commonly undertaken by private enterprise; or 
does it depend upon the Court's assessment of the importance of the 
activity? 
C. WHICH OF CONGRESS'S POWERS ARE LIMITED BY THE 
TENTH AMENDMENT? 
The Court explicitly reserved the question whether the states' Tenth 
Amendment autonomy limited Congressional authority under either 
the Fourteenth Amendment or the spending power. With respect to the 
former, it might be argued that the states can enjoy no immunity from 
Congressional action under the Fourteenth Amendment because it was 
adopted later than the Tenth, but such a formalistic approach to so 
large a question would not appear very satisfactory. Even this avenue 
is unavailable, however, with respect to the spending power, and it 
i,s pursuant to that power, as discussed above, that the Congress has 
gone farthest in interfering with the traditional incidents of state 
sovereignty. An attempt by the Court, at this time, to curb Congress's 
exercise of such power would have a marked effect on state-federal 
relations. 112 
As these questions suggest, the full meaning of Usery is not likely to 
be known for many years. Until they are answered, however, the 
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decision is bound to exercise an unsettling effect upon state-federal 
relationships. 
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